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Abstract 
We analyze the impact of the redevelopment potential on commercial real estate 
transaction prices. First, using a probit model, we compute the fitted redevelopment 
potential. This potential is primarily determined by the difference in net operating 
income (NOI) per square foot of land (sql) to the potential highest and best use (HBU) 
of the property. This difference reflects the economic obsolescence of a property. 
Second, we run a 2SLS model with the fitted redevelopment potential as an 
instrument for the redevelopment dummy. We find that having a 100 percent 
redevelopment potential increases the property's price by nine to 17 percent. 
 
Key words: Probability of redevelopment, Real Estate Pricing, Competing Risk.  
JEL classification: R32, C01.  
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1. Introduction
Land is a fundamental input in production and store of wealth of a coun-
try. Land values are critical to understanding the development of urban
economies, and they are an essential source of revenue for local governments.
Therefore, it is imperative to advance our knowledge of what constitutes
land values. Location, characteristics, and the redevelopment option value
determine the land value. However, the latter is often disregarded. The re-
development option value is the option, without obligation, of changing the
use of land and the physical structure built on that land to the highest and
best use (HBU). Thus, the redevelopment potential affects property prices
and plays a crucial role in how cities evolve.
In this study, we investigate the impact of the redevelopment potential on
the individual value of commercial real estate properties within more than 30
American cities. We proceed as follows. Using Real Capital Analytics (RCA)
data, we first measure the redevelopment potential as the stated intention
by buyers to buy a property for redevelopment. To deal with the poten-
tial reverse causality bias between redevelopment potential and transaction
prices, we instrument the redevelopment dummy with the fitted redevelop-
ment potential. In the next step, we thus run a probit model to predict
the redevelopment potential of a given property. We find that the difference
between the current net operating income (NOI) per square foot of land (sfl)
and the one associated with the potential highest and best use (HBU) of the
property is a strong predictor of the redevelopment potential. Finally, we
determine the impact of the redevelopment potential on transaction prices.
Results show that having a 100 percent redevelopment potential increases
the property’s price by nine to 17 percent.
Because the choice to redevelop by investors mimics an American call
option1, it can be analyzed in an option pricing framework. Titman (1985)
uses the real options approach to develop a simple equation for pricing vacant
land. He shows that under uncertainty about the optimal future building in-
tensity, it is often beneficial to delay investment and maintain the option
to develop in the future. This is because the development call option is a
1An American option can be exercised at any time up to the maturity date, whereas a
European option can only be exercised at maturity.
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levered derivative of the HBU, and this makes it very volatile. By applying a
real option-pricing model to real estate development, Williams (1991) shows
that the optimal date and intensity at which to develop a property depends
on the uncertain future revenues it generates and on its costs of develop-
ment. Quigg (1993) is the first study to assess the empirical validity of the
real option-pricing model in the case of real estate assets. Using data on
land transactions for Seattle, she finds that investors are willing to pay a six
percent price premium for plots of land having a development option. Using
a similar framework, Grovenstein et al. (2011) theoretically and empirically
determine the real option values of development and delay for vacant land in
the City of Chicago. They find that the magnitude of the option premium
varies substantially across individual land-use types.
Clapp and Salavei (2010), Clapp et al. (2012a), and Clapp et al. (2012b)
devise a smart technique to estimate the redevelopment option value within
the standard hedonic framework developed by Rosen (1974). They do that
by adding the call option to the net present value of a property and using
a measure of development intensity as a proxy for the redevelopment option
value.2 With this approach, the redevelopment option value is separated
from the value of the property in its current use. However, both values are
related to the characteristics of the property. For example, the present value
of the property in its current use decreases with age, but its redevelopment
option value increases with age. The authors also point out that the quan-
tity of structural capital increases the value of the property in its current use
but decreases the redevelopment option value. In contrast, McMillen and
O’Sullivan (2013) find that under uncertainty over the future price of struc-
tural capital, the redevelopment option value may increase with the quantity
of structural capital.
Munneke and Womack (2018) estimate the redevelopment option value by
introducing the probability of redevelopment into the hedonic model. More
specifically, they estimate the probability of redevelopment with a probit
model and include it as an explanatory variable in a hedonic regression. The
2As intensity measures the authors use the maximum floor space allowed minus the
floor space already built, lagged assessed building value divided by assessed land value,
and the ratio of the square footage of the property to the square footage of neighboring
new constructions.
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authors find that location is a significant determinant of redevelopment and
that the redevelopment option values vary substantially across space.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we estimate the
redevelopment option value using a novel strategy relying on three different
proxies for redevelopment. These proxies are the difference in NOI, floor-
to-area ratio (FAR), and property type to those of surrounding properties
developed at the HBU. Second, using these proxies, we investigate the de-
terminants leading investors to buy a property for redevelopment. Third,
we examine renovations as a competing risk to redevelopments. This helps
us document the differences in depreciation channels of a property. Finally,
we fill the existing gap in studies analyzing the redevelopment option value
for commercial real estate. In doing so, we differentiate between residential,
office, retail, and industrial properties.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illus-
trates the conceptual framework for the valuation of redevelopment options.
Section 3 presents the empirical methodology and discuses the identifying
assumptions. Section 4 describes the rich data on commercial real estate and
the construction of the proxy variables. Section 5 analyzes the results for the
different estimation models and Section 6 concludes.
2. Conceptual framework
In this section, we lay out the fundamental mechanisms behind the valu-
ation of redevelopment options. Figure 1 illustrates how the redevelopment
option value is linked to land and property values over several real estate
cycles. The horizontal axis shows the time, and the vertical axis shows the
value of the property’s components. At the points indicated by “D,” the
property is (re)developed. Each time this implies a large investment of cap-
ital to build a physical structure on a given plot of land.
As Geltner et al. (2014) persuasively show with a real option value model,
land is always developed or redeveloped at its HBU as-if-vacant. In other
words, the developer builds the most profitable structure possible for that
location at that point in time.3 The dotted pink line “H” shows the HBU
3Note that the developer takes the construction and demolition costs into account.
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value over time. This value depends on the location’s surroundings, secular
trends, and capital flows that affect the property value. In our stylized figure,
the fluctuations in H represent the volatility and cyclicality in the real estate
market.
Figure 1: Property and location value components over time
This figure is based on Figure 1 from Geltner et al. (2018)
The solid black line “P” depicts the property asset value. This is the value
the property would sell for in a well-functioning market. The dashed red line
“L” illustrates the land value as if it were vacant. Following the residual
theory of land value, this must equal the value of current HBU minus the
cost of the physical structure required to attain this HBU.4 The jumps in the
property asset value at times D reflects the investment of financial capital to
develop or redevelop the physical structure.
Over time, the property depreciates due to physical, functional, and/or
economic obsolescence. Physical obsolescence refers to the physical wear
down of property, e.g., the chipping or fading of the paint. Functional ob-
4In this figure, we assume that the construction costs remains approximately constant
over time.
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solescence refers to changes in technology, tastes, and user requirements,
e.g., building’s sustainability has become increasingly important. Lastly,
economic obsolescence refers to the case when the building’s structure is no
longer suitable to the HBU, and therefore is the wrong type. As pointed out
by Geltner et al. (2018), this last type of obsolescence reflects the redevel-
opment option value.5 When the value of the existing structure and land
is equal (or less) to the value of vacant land and the demolition costs, the
property is redeveloped. Brueckner (1980) and Wheaton (1982) outline this
discernment theoretically.6
The solid blue line “R” shows the redevelopment option value. Note that
the redevelopment option value is not a separate asset or legal claim, but
it is embedded in the land value. This call option can be exercised at any
time upon payment of the physical structure to attain the HBU. The strike
price of the redevelopment call option includes the demolition cost and the
opportunity cost of the existing structure. This opportunity cost is the loss
in NOI during the redevelopment. Right after a (re)development, the rede-
velopment option value is very low, because the opportunity cost of the new
existing structure is very high. As time elapses and the HBU evolves, the
redevelopment option value gets deeper in the money.
3. Empirical analysis
We build on Clapp and Salavei (2010) and express the (log) price per
square foot P of a property as a linear function of redevelopment potential
r and a vector of market and physical characteristics X:
P = β0 + β1r + β2X + ε, (1)
5Note that the redevelopment option value increases, over time, as the building struc-
ture depreciates, and the HBU evolves away from the current building structure.
6In bust periods, the HBU may be so low that it is not profitable to redevelop. This
was the case, e.g., in certain areas in Detroit after the Great Recession. In such cases, the
redevelopment option value is zero. The right without obligation of the redevelopment
option value means it cannot be negative.
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where ε is the error term.7 The sale price P includes the price of land and
the value of the existing structure.
To consistently estimate (1) with OLS, the assumption E[rε|X] = 0 must
hold. However, the literature tells us that the redevelopment potential r is
a function of the price per sf P , implying that OLS estimates are plagued
by reverse causality bias. Since, ceteris paribus, we expect that a higher
price reduces the redevelopment potential, the OLS estimate β̂1,OLS is biased
downwards.
Typically, reverse causality is dealt with 2SLS models, instrumenting for
the endogenous variable. However, we do not observe redevelopment poten-
tial r (a continuous variable). We only observe a binary variable rd indicating
whether or not a property was bought to be redeveloped. Since our variable
of interest is an endogenous dummy (Vytlacil and Yildiz, 2007), we follow
Heckman (1978), Angrist and Krueger (2001), and Adams et al. (2009), and
employ the following procedure. First, we estimate a probit model of the
determinants of redevelopment rd. The model is given by:
Pr(rd = 1|X,Z) = Φ(θ0 + θ1X + θ2Z + ρ), (2)
where Φ(.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function, Z defines
proxies for the determinants of redevelopment not included in (1), and ρ is
the error term. After estimating (2), we derive a continuous redevelopment
potential r̂p by predicting fitted values according to the considered variables.
In the next step, we estimate a 2SLS model using the continuous fitted
redevelopment potential r̂p as an instrument for the redevelopment dummy
rd. More precisely, we estimate the equation
P = β0 + β1rd + β2X + ε, (3)
where the first stage is given by
rd = γ0 + γ1r̂p + γ2X + ε
′, (4)
where ε′ is the error term. Our procedure is valid if our proxies Z only affect
price P through the redevelopment option value. Note that this is different
from just plugging in the fitted potential r̂p directly into Equation (3) and
7We omit property-level subscripts for readability.
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running an OLS, i.e., regressing P on r̂p and X directly. As pointed out by
Angrist and Krueger (2001) this could lead to misspecification and incon-
sistent estimates. Our specification has several advantages. First, the IV
standard errors are still asymptotically valid (Kelejian, 1971). Second, we
take the nature of the endogenous redevelopment dummy rd into account.
Third, we transform the redevelopment dummy rd into a continuous redevel-
opment potential r̂d, which allows us to estimate the redevelopment option
value for all the properties according to their characteristics.
4. Data and stylized facts
We rely on RCA georeferenced transaction data on commercial proper-
ties from 2001 to 2018. RCA captures over 90 percent of all commercial real
estate transactions in the institutional investor space. This unique data set
covers more than 30 American cities. It features property characteristics such
as sales prices, NOI, size of land, FAR, year of sale, property type, location,
and construction year. The data also contains information on the intent of
purchase, i.e., whether it is used as an investment, or if the property will be
redeveloped (see Bokhari and Geltner (2018)).
First, we split the data into two subsets. The first subset is data on newly
developed properties, defined as everything built after 2001. This data is used
to construct the proxies Z and is further discussed in Section 4.1. The sec-
ond subset, are all the properties built before 2001 and is described in this
Section. After filtering out extreme values and dropping missing values, we
are left with almost 46,000 transactions between 2001 and 2018 of properties
built before 2001. Of these nearly 46,000 properties, over five percent were
purchased with the intent to be redeveloped, see Table 1. We split our data
in 2001 because of two reasons. First, the data covers transaction prices
from 2001 onwards. Second, commercial real estate cycles can span decades
(Wheaton, 1999).
All data comes directly from RCA, except for the NOI per sfl for the
redevelopment properties. In approximately 70 percent of the cases, these
properties have either missing or zero NOI, as the properties were already va-
cated for redevelopment.8 Given that we are interested in the potential NOI
8As is apparent from the data, the structure of properties with missing or zero NOI is
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per sfl of the existing structure, we impute the missing and zero NOIs as fol-
lows. First, we find the closest ten properties that are not being redeveloped,
were built within ten years, were sold within five years, are within five kilo-
meters, and are the same property type as the target property. Subsequently,
we impute the weighted average NOI per sfl. The weight is determined by
the inverse of the distance to the target property. We use market and prop-
erty type-specific NOI indexes provided to us by RCA to correct the imputed
NOIs if the year of sale of the “comparable” is different from the year of sale
of the target property. Note that we only allow for a five-year difference
and that we impute the NOI per square foot of land (sfl) and not structure.
This is because investors want to maximize the income per sfl when they
redevelop. The top panel of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of all the
transactions in this data set. The middle panel shows the same descriptive
statistics of redevelopment properties, and the bottom panel shows the de-
scriptive statistics of non-redevelopment properties.
Table 1 contains some interesting stylized facts. There are some clear
differences between redevelopment properties and non-redevelopment prop-
erties. Note that the NOI and sales price per sfl for redevelopment properties
are both approximately double the ones for non-redevelopment properties,
while the FAR is only slightly larger. The FAR is 0.9 for non-redevelopment
properties and 1.2 for redevelopment properties, whereas the NOI is $12 and
$24 per sfl, respectively. Sales prices per sf are slightly less than double
for redevelopment properties ($390) than for non-redevelopment properties
($215). Redevelopment properties are, on average, also closer to the cen-
tral business district (CBD). All of this is consistent with the literature, i.e.,
redevelopments are triggered by high land values. As expected, the age of
redevelopment properties is also higher than for non-redevelopment proper-
ties. This is because the redevelopment option value increases with age.
In our estimations, we include matrix X to control for the differences
between redevelopment and non-redevelopment properties. This matrix con-
tains the property’s current NOI per sfl, which captures most of the unob-
served heterogeneity; current FAR = Structure size
Land size
; the property type; the age
still standing. We exclude development sites from the data.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of data set
variable mean SD lower 10% higher 90%
Full sample (45,732 obs.)
Redevelopments 0.055 0.227 0.000 0.000
Sales price per square foot of land $ 225.347 $ 538.199 $ 15.089 $ 525.123
NOI per square foot of land $ 12.560 $ 28.487 $ 1.190 $ 29.194
Distance to closest CBD (km) 24.464 30.583 5.190 50.056
Age 38.823 23.663 16.000 81.000
Floor area ratio (FAR) 0.940 1.383 0.217 2.410
Redevelopment properties (2,494 obs.)
Sales price per square foot of land $ 389.875 $ 823.417 $ 14.954 $ 980.137
NOI per square foot of land $ 24.038 $ 45.162 $ 1.576 $ 69.154
Distance to closest CBD (km) 19.217 23.502 2.315 44.855
Age 47.561 26.812 18.000 91.000
Floor area ratio (FAR) 1.232 1.795 0.215 3.232
Non redeveloped properties (43,238 obs)
Sales price per square foot of land $ 215.857 $ 515.385 $ 15.100 $ 504.606
NOI per square foot of land $ 11.898 $ 27.069 $ 1.174 $ 27.431
Distance to closest CBD (km) 24.767 30.915 5.371 50.290
Age 38.319 23.369 16.000 79.000
Floor area ratio (FAR) 0.923 1.354 0.217 2.350
All data provided to us by Real Capital Analytics (RCA) for the years 2001 until 2018,
for properties built before 2001. SD is the standard deviation, lower is the 10th quantile
quantile and higher is the 90th quantile. NOI is the Net Operating Income of the property.
The floor area ratio is the amount of square foot divided by the square foot of land. CBD
is the Central Business District, as defined by RCA. Age is the construction year of a
property minus the year sold. The middle panel gives the descriptive statistics of a subset
of our full sample (top panel) of redevelopment properties. The bottom panel gives the
descriptive statistics of the subset of non-redevelopment properties.
of the property9; time dummies; and location dummies. Thus, including X
9Note that most of the depreciation is captured by the current NOI of the property.
What is left is the deprecation of the capitalization rate. This is sometimes also referred
to as the “caprate creep”.
10
addresses the selection bias.
4.1. Constructing our proxies
As explicated in Section 3 the decision to redevelop is endogenous to the
price of the property. To address the reverse causality we construct three
proxies for redevelopment (relevance) that only affect prices through an in-
crease in redevelopment potential (exogeneity).
We start by looking at the potential HBU of every property in our data.
We construct the HBU, by assessing newly developed properties, making the
(non-controversial) assumption, that developers always maximize their prof-
its and thus, built according to the location’s HBU. Therefore, we use the
sample of newly constructed properties (constructed after 2001) to construct
HBU metrics for our target properties (constructed before 2001). Our pri-
mary variable of interest is the NOI per sfl of the HBU property. We use
this variable to compute the difference between the current (imputed) NOI of
the existing structure, and the current (imputed) NOI of the HBU structure.
This difference is a perfect proxy, as it is not affected by the property, nor
the investor itself. The assumption is that the higher the potential gains of
redevelopment, the higher the redevelopment potential.
For every property constructed before 2001 in our data, we match the
closest ten newly developed properties (properties constructed after 2001),
as long as they are within five kilometers, and are sold and built within five
years of the target property’s transaction. To compute the potential NOI
of these properties, we use the same weighted averaging approach as previ-
ously described. We also correct the imputed NOIs of the newly developed
properties using the RCA NOI index if their transaction year differs the one
of comparable properties. Note that the RCA NOI index are market and
property type specific. Our first proxy variable is labeled N , and is defined
as;
N =
(
NOI
hbu
LS
hbu
)
−
(
NOIcurrent
LScurrent
)
, (5)
where LS is the land size. Note that in theory NOI should capture all the
characteristics of the property. Thus, the difference in NOI to the HBU is
an excellent proxy for redevelopment.
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We also construct two additional proxies, which are similar. The first one
is related to the FAR of HBU properties. If newly constructed properties have
higher densities compared to the target property, the land can achieve higher
sales prices. This density proxy is similar to the intensity measures used in
previous redevelopment option value literature for single-family housing, see
Clapp et al. (2009); Clapp and Salavei (2010); Clapp et al. (2012a) among
others. This variable, labeled F , is given by:
F =
(
SS
hbu
LS
hbu
)
−
(
SScurrent
LScurrent
)
, (6)
where SS is the structure size.
The second auxiliary proxy compares the type of the property, to the
comparable HBU type of properties and takes a value between zero and one.
RCA differentiates between four property types: residential, retail, indus-
trial, and office. For example, if the comparable HBU properties are 80
percent residential and 20 percent retail, and the corresponding property is
residential, the variable takes the value 0.8. If the corresponding property
were retail, the value of the variable would be 0.2. A value of zero (one) for
the property type variable indicates that none (all) of the newly developed
properties are of the same property type. That is, the higher the value, the
less economic obsolete is the property. In this case, we assume that the HBU
use of the site can change. All three proxies capture the economic obsoles-
cence channel that reflects the redevelopment option value. Table 2 shows
some descriptive statistics of the proxies.
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 give a clear picture. The difference
of NOI to the HBU is, on average, $40 per sfl for redevelopment properties.
In contrast, it is only $20 per sfl for non-redevelopment properties. Note
that the magnitude of these differences are large, considering that the av-
erage NOI per sfl for the existing (redevelopment) property is $24 (revisit
Table 1). For our FAR variable, we find similar magnitudes. Newly con-
structed properties have a FAR that is 1.2 higher compared to the existing
redevelopment properties, as opposed to “only” 0.5 higher FARs compared
to the existing non-redevelopment properties. The descriptive statistics of
our property type proxy show that of all the newly built properties, 27 per-
12
cent (36 percent) are of the same property type as the target redevelopment
(non-redevelopment) properties. This indicates that when the HBU property
type changes in an area, the amount of redevelopments increase.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of our constructed proxies
variable mean SD lower 10% higher 90%
Full sample (45,732 obs.)
N =
(
NOI
hbu
LS
hbu
)
−
(
NOIcurrent
LScurrent
)
$ 22.603 $ 45.595 $ 1.014 $59.186
F =
(
SS
hbu
LS
hbu
)
−
(
SScurrent
LScurrent
)
0.504 1.511 -0.254 1.651
HBU property type similarity 0.354 0.259 0.000 0.700
Redevelopment properties (2,494 obs.)
N =
(
NOI
hbu
LS
hbu
)
−
(
NOIcurrent
LScurrent
)
$ 39.190 $ 61.628 $ 1.410 $ 124.204
F =
(
SS
hbu
LS
hbu
)
−
(
SScurrent
LScurrent
)
1.207 2.657 -0.298 4.252
HBU property type similarity 0.273 0.249 0.000 0.600
Non redeveloped properties (43,238 obs)
N =
(
NOI
hbu
LS
hbu
)
−
(
NOIcurrent
LScurrent
)
$ 21.646 $ 44.306 $ 0.997 $ 55.537
F =
(
SS
hbu
LS
hbu
)
−
(
SScurrent
LScurrent
)
0.463 1.406 -0.252 1.530
HBU property type similarity 0.359 0.259 0.000 0.700
All variables are the difference between the current existing structures, and the newly
constructed HBU (highest and best use) structures. NOI is the net operating income, LS is
the land size (in square foot), and SS is the size of the structure (in square foot). The “HBU
property type similarity” is computed by looking at what percentage of the HBU properties
is the same as the target property. The middle panel gives the descriptive statistics of a
subset of our full sample (top panel) of redevelopment properties. The bottom panel gives
the descriptive statistics of the subset of non-redevelopment properties.
We argue that our three proxies satisfy the exclusion restriction because
these measures epitomize “call options” that only materialize if the property
is redeveloped. These proxies do not have a direct effect on prices. The higher
the value of these “call options” the higher the redevelopment potential.
Thus, they only affect the prices through the redevelopment potential.
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5. Results
5.1. Determinants of redevelopment
Table 3 shows the results for our (reduced form) probit Equation (Equa-
tion 2).
Table 3: Probit model: Determinants of redevelopments
Variable (i) (ii) (iii)
(Intercept) -2.632∗∗∗ -2.291∗∗∗ -2.306∗∗∗
(-11.56) (-10.24) (-10.06)
lnN = ln
((
NOI
hbu
LS
hbu
)
−
(
NOIcurrent
LScurrent
))
0.037∗∗∗ 0.003
(4.20) (0.30)
lnF = ln
((
SS
hbu
LS
hbu
)
−
(
SScurrent
LScurrent
))
0.091∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(10.06) (9.19)
HBU property type similarity -0.681∗∗∗ -0.681∗∗∗
(-14.93) (-14.93)
ln NOILS 0.298
∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(15.02) (13.70) (13.68)
ln Distance to closest CBD -0.119∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗
(-7.71) (-6.36) (-6.16)
Age 0.027∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(13.70) (11.54) (11.52)
Age2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(-11.24) (-9.16) (-9.15)
ln SSLS (FAR) -0.333
∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗
(-14.00) (-12.36) (-12.36)
Time fe Yes Yes Yes
Metro fe Yes Yes Yes
Property type fe Yes Yes Yes
AIC 17,125 16,773 16,775
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable
is a 1/0 dummy indicating whether or not the property was bought with the intent of
redeveloping it. NOI is the properties net operating income, LS is the size of the land (in
square foot), and SS is the size of the structure (in square foot). CBD is the closest central
business district, as defined by RCA. HBU is the highest and best use, measured by looking
at newly developed properties surrounding the target property. The HBU property type
similarity is computed by looking at what percentage of the HBU properties is the same
as the target property. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterium.
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In the first column of Table 3 we show the results of the probit model for
redevelopments when we include the log difference between the HBU NOI
and the current NOI of every property (logN). Our two other proxies also
have the expected sign, see the second column of Table 3. The redevelop-
ment potential increases with the HBU density measure (variable F ) and
decreases with the property type similarity proxy. In the third column, we
combine all the proxies. Because of the high collinearity between NOI and
square footage of the structure, combining the variables N and F results in
insignificant estimates for N . Still, looking at our proxies separately, we find
t-statistics of 4.2 for N in the first column, and 10.1 and -14.9 for the proxies
in the second column. Thus, we conclude that our proxies not only move
the redevelopment variable in the predicted direction but also that they are
relevant. Note that the second model (ii) is the one with the best fit in terms
of the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
The estimates of the remaining determinants X also have the expected
sign. First, higher NOI per sfl increases the potential of the redevelopment.
This is because higher NOI entails higher land values (higher economic activ-
ity), which in turn increases the redevelopment potential. However, note that
holding NOI (and other variables) constant, an increase in density (FAR) re-
sults in a lower redevelopment potential. This is because it is more costly to
demolish large structures. The further away a property is from the CBD, the
lower the redevelopment potential, even after controlling for property level
NOI and HBU variables. Similarly, age and age squared are also significant
after controlling for property level NOI and HBU variables. It is well estab-
lished that most depreciation is embedded into the NOI (which we control
for); see Bokhari and Geltner (2018). Thus, the fact that we still find sig-
nificant estimates for distance to closest CBD, age, and age squared, is most
likely caused by “cap rate creep” (the depreciation of the cap rate). In other
words, investors expect that older properties will generate less NOI in the
future, therefore increasing the redevelopment potential.
The fixed effects for year of sale, property types, and MSAs are shown
in Tables A.8 – A.9 in the Appendix. The year of sale dummies control
for the macro-economic environment, which is not explained by the NOI.
The highest redevelopment potential was in 2005, with an estimate of 0.995.
The results show a similar redevelopment potential at the beginning and the
end of our data sample. Although, as previously noted, we control for NOI,
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and the average NOI increased considerably between 2000 – 2018. Of all the
property types, ceteris paribus, industrial properties are the most likely to be
redeveloped, followed by retail, office, and residential properties. Since indus-
trial properties are typically cheaper to demolish, this result is unsurprising.
Finally, the MSA dummies control for local zoning, and the competitiveness
of the development industry. Most of these estimates are not significant.
Interestingly, all coefficients for MSAs in Florida are positive and significant,
indicating that there is more development in Florida than can be explain-
able by NOI alone. The MSA with the least development, ceteris paribus,
is Portland, Oregon. This is unsurprising, given that Portland is known to
have stringent zoning and geographic restrictions (Saiz, 2010).
5.2. Redevelopment option value
Table 4 shows the estimates of the redevelopment option value model.
The first column of Table 4 shows the OLS results, where redevelopment
is a dummy indicating if a property was bought to be redeveloped. This
estimation ignores the reverse causality between redevelopment and prices.
We find a significant and negative price-redevelopment elasticity of -0.072.
However, as argued throughout this paper, we do not believe this to be a
causal relationship. To estimate the causal relationship between prices and
redevelopment, we apply our methodology described in Section 3, and use
the fitted values for the redevelopment potential from Table 3 as an instru-
ment. The second to the fourth column of Table 4 shows these results. When
instrumenting for redevelopments, we find a strong and positive coefficient
for redevelopment. In the second column we find that whenever a property
has a 100 percent redevelopment potential, the price of the property, ceteris
paribus, increases by 17 percent. Using the other proxies slightly attenuates
this effect. A 100 percent redevelopment potential increases the price of the
property by nine percent. From the Hausman (1978) test (not shown here,
but available upon request), we conclude that the difference between the IV
model estimates (second to fourth column) and the standard OLS model
(first column) estimate are statistically significant. The first IV model (sec-
ond column) features the largest t-statistic, although the fit is equal between
the models. See the adjusted R2 and the root mean squared errors (RMSE)
at the bottom of Table 4.
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Table 4: Redevelopment option value model
Variable OLS IV (i) IV (ii) IV (iii)
(Intercept) 3.122∗∗∗ 3.122∗∗∗ 3.122∗∗∗ 3.122∗∗∗
(99.29) (99.19) (99.19) (99.19)
Redevelopment -0.072∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(-9.19) (3.68) (2.43) (2.70)
ln NOILS 0.788
∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
(220.71) (184.46) (194.53) (194.40)
ln Distance to closest CBD -0.034∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(-13.71) (-11.49) (-12.18) (-12.11)
Age -0.011∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(-34.04) (-32.94) (-33.25) (-33.35)
Age2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(31.28) (31.14) (31.18) (31.26)
ln SSLS (FAR) 0.267
∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
(60.03) (54.84) (56.29) (56.41)
Time fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Metro fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property type fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
RMSE 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable is
log of transaction price per sfl lnP . NOI is the properties net operating income, and SS
is the size of the structure (in square foot). CBD is the closest central business district,
as defined by RCA. For the IV models we instrument for the redevelopment dummy
with the fitted redevelopment potential. In the first IV (i) model we only use the fitted
redevelopment potential estimated with the log difference in NOI of the HBU properties
and the target property, or lnN . In the second model we use the fitted redevelopment
potential estimated with the log difference in FAR between the HBU and the current
property, or lnF , and the percentage of properties built within our defined area that are
of the same property type as the target property. In the third IV (iii) we use the fitted
redevelopment potential estimated with all proxies.
The remaining estimates have the expected sign and magnitude and
hardly change between the models. Higher NOI and more square feet re-
sult in higher prices. We also find evidence of “cap rate creep”, i.e., the
depreciation of cap rates. Even when controlling for NOI the distance to the
CBD is still significant. This means, that properties further away from the
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CBD trade with a higher cap rate, resulting in lower prices.
The year fixed effects (see Table A.10 in the Appendix) reveal that prices
increased until 2007/2008, then dropped, and subsequently increased again
after 2011. Given that we already control for NOI, we interpret the year
fixed effect estimates as the inverse of cap rates. As such, cap rates are at
its lowest at the end of our sample in 2018. Furthermore, the property type
fixed effects (see Table A.10 in the Appendix) show that apartments trade
with the lowest cap rates, followed by retail, office, and industrial properties.
Comparing the MSAs with each other (see Table A.11 in the Appendix), we
conclude that most West coast MSAs trade with a relatively low cap rate (San
Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, but also Seattle), as well as New York,
Boston, and Washington DC. We find the highest cap rate in Jacksonville.
5.3. Auxiliary Regressions
As robustness, we estimate two additional models. In the first one, we
sightly change our redevelopment option value proxies. In our primary model
we use the log absolute differences in NOI and FAR per sfl between the HBU
and the current property. For this model, we use the log relative difference
in NOI and FAR per sfl between the HBU and the current property. The
additional two variables ∆N and ∆F are given by10:
∆N = ln
(
NOI
hbu
LS
hbu
)
− ln
(
NOIcurrent
LScurrent
)
,
∆F = ln
(
SS
hbu
LS
hbu
)
− ln
(
SScurrent
LScurrent
)
.
We omit the discussion of the results of the probit model and the fixed ef-
fects here. These are available upon request. Table 5 shows the results of our
auxiliary redevelopment option value model. We find that all the estimates
remain robust. The price of a property with 100 percent redevelopment po-
tential increases between 11 percent and 21 percent. The fit does not change
according to the adjusted R2, and root mean squared error (RMSE) (see
bottom of Table 5).
10Note that our proxy HBU property type similarity remains identical.
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Table 5: Auxiliary redevelopment option value model
Variable IV (i) IV (ii) IV (iii)
(Intercept) 3.122∗∗∗ 3.122∗∗∗ 3.122∗∗∗
(99.21) (99.19) (99.20)
Redevelopment 0.206∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(5.53) (2.74) (3.48)
ln NOILS 0.772
∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗
(183.63) (193.42) (193.10)
ln Distance to closest CBD -0.029∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(-10.93) (-12.07) (-11.87)
Age -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(-33.77) (-33.28) (-33.57)
Age2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(31.81) (31.23) (31.45)
ln SSLS (FAR) 0.285
∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(55.80) (56.22) (56.55)
Time fe Yes Yes Yes
Metro fe Yes Yes Yes
Property type fe Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93
RMSE 0.37 0.37 0.37
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable is
log of transaction price per sfl lnP . NOI is the properties net operating income, and SS
is the size of the structure (in square foot). CBD is the closest central business district,
as defined by RCA. For the IV models we instrument for the redevelopment dummy with
the fitted redevelopment potential. In the first IV (i) model we only use the fitted redevel-
opment potential estimated with the log relative difference in NOI of the HBU properties
and the target property, or ∆N . In the second model we use the fitted redevelopment
potential estimated with the log relative difference in FAR between the HBU and the
current property, or ∆F , and the percentage of properties built within our defined area
that are of the same property type as the target property. In the third IV (iii) we use the
fitted redevelopment potential estimated with all proxies.
For our second auxiliary model, we utilize RCA data on renovations.
RCA’s definition of renovation is widely defined, and can be anything from
a new lobby area to an entirely new interior for a property. Still, there
are many similarities between renovations and redevelopments. Most impor-
tantly, they both entail considerable capital expenditures that are not related
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to the day to day maintenance of the property. However, there are also ex-
tensive differences. Renovations cannot redress economic obsolescence. If
HBU densities and property type use change, the property owner will need
to redevelop. Rather, renovations redress physical and functional obsoles-
cence (Francke and Van de Minne, 2017), meaning modernizing the existing
structure in such a way that they match current day tastes and preferences
(without changing property type). Therefore, we see renovations as a com-
peting risk to redevelopments. In other words, at any time, an investor can
decide whether to renovate or redevelop a property (or sell it as an invest-
ment property obviously), but not both simultaneously. This does not mean
we expect similar signs or magnitudes with this model. For example, prop-
erties that are very economically obsolete might not be worth renovating. In
contrast, more expensive properties - in the right area - are expected to be
renovated instead of redeveloped.
In our data, we find that approximately six percent of the properties were
bought to be renovated, slightly more than to be redeveloped (which is 5.5
percent, see Table 1). We use the same procedures and proxies (i.e., the log
of the absolute differences in NOI and FAR to the HBU) as in our primary
model. In general, we expect that properties that are more disparate from
their potential HBU, are not worth renovating.
5.3.1. Determinants of renovations
Table 6 shows the results of the probit model for renovations. Compar-
ing the results from the probit model for redevelopments (Table 3) with the
one for renovations (Table 6) yields some interesting insights. Compared to
the redevelopment model, the renovation model estimates flip sign, are at-
tenuated, or are insignificant altogether. Remarkably, our NOI proxy (log
N) does not impact the renovation potentials. Nor does the current NOI.
FAR has a positive effect on the renovation potential, whereas it was neg-
ative on the redevelopment potential. Larger structures are more costly to
redevelop, and as such, the only way to increase NOI is by renovating the
current property. An increase in the difference of FAR to the HBU decreases
the renovation potential. The competing risk of redevelopment most likely
causes this. If an investor can considerably increase its NOI by increasing
the FAR through redevelopment, she will likely not deem any renovations
worth it. Our third proxy, the proxy, HBU property type similarity, remains
significant and negative, although the effect is attenuated (compared to rede-
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Table 6: Probit model: Determinants of renovations
Variable (i) (ii) (iii)
(Intercept) -1.948∗∗∗ -1.836∗∗∗ -1.884∗∗∗
(-9.53) (-9.14) (-9.14)
lnN = ln
((
NOI
hbu
LS
hbu
)
−
(
NOIcurrent
LScurrent
))
-0.004 0.009
(-0.45) (1.03)
lnF = ln
((
SS
hbu
LS
hbu
)
−
(
SScurrent
LScurrent
))
-0.018∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(-2.36) (-2.57)
HBU property type similarity -0.261∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗
(-6.16) (-6.23)
ln NOILS 0.007 0.022 0.022
(0.33) (1.06) (1.03)
ln Distance to closest CBD 0.003 -0.006 -0.002
(0.21) (-0.39) (-0.16)
Age 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(2.60) (2.52) (2.45)
Age2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(-5.10) (-4.92) (-4.90)
ln SSLS (FAR) 0.056
∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(2.16) (2.37) (2.35)
Time fe Yes Yes Yes
Metro fe Yes Yes Yes
Property type fe Yes Yes Yes
AIC 19,368 19,325 19,326
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable
is a 1/0 dummy indicating whether or not the property was bought with the intent of
renovating it. NOI is the properties net operating income, LS is the size of the land (in
square foot), and SS is the size of the structure (in square foot). CBD is the closest central
business district, as defined by RCA. HBU is the highest and best use, measured by looking
at newly developed properties surrounding the target property. The HBU property type
similarity is computed by looking at what percentage of the HBU properties is the same
as the target property. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterium.
velopment). If the current structure has the same use as the HBU property,
the renovation potential decreases. Given that our NOI proxy (log N) is
insignificant in all renovation models, we can conclude that it is not relevant.
For the sake of consistency, we still report the results when using this proxy
in the renovation model.
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5.3.2. Price of renovation properties
In Table 7 we present the estimates for the renovation model.
Table 7: Renovation model
Variable OLS IV (i) IV (ii) IV (iii)
(Intercept) 3.123∗∗∗ 3.121∗∗∗ 3.139∗∗∗ 3.133∗∗∗
(99.25) (98.64) (99.29) (99.07)
Renovation -0.032∗∗∗ 0.037 -0.441∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗
(-4.24) (0.45) (-5.50) (-3.49)
ln NOILS 0.785
∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗
(220.83) (220.51) (220.87) (220.73)
ln Distance to closest CBD -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(-13.22) (-13.23) (-13.13) (-13.16)
Age -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(-34.82) (-34.61) (-33.85) (-34.11)
Age2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(31.79) (30.75) (29.19) (29.74)
ln SSLS (FAR) 0.272
∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(61.19) (60.82) (61.41) (61.21)
Time fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Metro fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property type fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
RMSE 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable is
log of transaction price per sfl lnP . NOI is the properties net operating income, and SS
is the size of the structure (in square foot). CBD is the closest central business district,
as defined by RCA. For the IV models we instrument for the renovation dummy with the
fitted renovation potential. In the first IV (i) model we only use the fitted renovation
potential estimated with the log difference in NOI of the HBU properties and the target
property, or lnN . In the second model we use the fitted renovation potential estimated
with the log difference in FAR between the HBU and the current property, or lnF , and
the percentage of properties built within our defined area that are of the same property
type as the target property. In the third IV (iii) we use the fitted renovation potential
estimated with all proxies.
Note that the variable “renovation” is a binary variable indicating prop-
erties that were bought to be renovated and not properties that were recently
renovated. The OLS model (which ignores the endogeneity issues) yields a
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small but significant negative effect of renovations on prices (see first column
of Table 7). The results for the first IV model (IV (i)) are insignificant. This
is hardly surprising, given that the proxy used in this column (log N) is
insignificant in the probit model (see Table 6). Using the highly significant
proxies in the second IV model (IV (ii)) we find that a property that needs
to be renovated (100 percent renovation potential) trades with a 44 percent
discount compared to a newly renovated property (zero percent renovation
potential). Since the renovation model captures the physical and functional
obsolescence channels, this is hardly surprising. This discount represents the
investment of financial capital needed to bring to reverse the physical and
functional depreciation. The final column shows the results if we use all the
proxies, including the insignificant one (log N). These results indicate that a
100 percent renovation renovation potential decreases the price by 28 percent.
All other estimates remain mostly unchanged compared to our earlier find-
ings with the redevelopment option value model. The fixed effects estimates
(for both the probit and renovation model) are available upon request.
6. Conclusion
As urban areas age, redevelopment and renovation become ever more crit-
ical. To analyze how the redevelopment potential affects commercial property
prices, we employ a novel strategy that addresses the reverse causality and
sample selection bias. Moreover, we provide information on the determinants
of redevelopment and renovation.
We find that a larger difference to the HBU in NOI and FAR, as well as
being the wrong type of property, significantly increase the redevelopment po-
tential for commercial real estate. These three proxies capture the economic
obsolescence channel. Moreover, the redevelopment potential increases with
the property’s NOI, age, and proximity to the CBD. In contrast, higher FAR
decreases the redevelopment potential because it leads to higher demolition
costs. Industrial properties are most likely to be redeveloped, followed by
retail, office, and residential properties. Our estimations suggest that having
a 100 percent redevelopment potential increases the property’s price by nine
to 17 percent. We also find that the redevelopment option value is very het-
erogeneous across American cities.
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Further, we find that neither the difference to the HBU in NOI nor the
property’s NOI drives the renovation potential. Property’s FAR has a posi-
tive impact on the renovation potential, while the difference to the HBU in
FAR has a negative one. As with redevelopments, being the wrong property
type increases the renovation potential, although the effect is much smaller.
On average, a property that needs to be renovated trades with a 28 to 44
percent discount compared to a newly renovated property. This reflects the
physical and functional obsolescence of the property.
Our results hold essential lessons for the understanding of the develop-
ment of urban economies. First, potential NOI is one of the main drivers of
redevelopment for commercial real estate. Second, high land values trigger
redevelopments.
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Appendix A. Tables
Table A.8: Probit model: Year and property type fixed
effects
Variable (i) (ii) (iii) Obs.
Year of Sale
2000 (Ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 574
2001 0.062 0.064 0.064 730
2002 0.055 0.059 0.059 899
2003 0.199 0.193 0.194 1,127
2004 0.610∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 1,775
2005 0.995∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 3,893
2006 0.789∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ 3,888
2007 0.533∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 3,675
2008 0.408∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 1,815
2009 0.295∗ 0.322∗ 0.323∗ 833
2010 0.251 0.281∗ 0.281∗ 1,282
2011 0.424∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 2,204
2012 0.431∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 2,998
2013 0.631∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 3,278
2014 0.402∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 3,557
2015 0.300∗∗ 0.310∗∗ 0.310∗∗ 3,819
2016 0.227 0.241 0.241 3,464
2017 0.105 0.106 0.106 3,085
2018 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 2,836
Property type
Apartment (Ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 23,491
Industrial 0.635∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 6,623
Office 0.214∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 8,038
Retail 0.224∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 7,580
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. This table shows the
year fixed effects results for the Probit model in Table 3. The frequency of the variables
is also given by Obs. Ref. gives the reference (omitted) category.
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Table A.9: Probit model: Metro area fixed effects
Variable IV (i) IV (ii) IV (iii) Obs.
Metro area
Atlanta (Ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 2,221
Baltimore 0.059 0.075 0.076 375
Boston Metro 0.208∗∗ 0.228∗∗ 0.227∗∗ 580
Charlotte 0.100 0.117 0.118 512
Chicago 0.215∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 1,098
Co Springs 0.151 0.120 0.124 253
Dallas 0.036 0.006 0.007 1,289
Denver -0.128 -0.067 -0.066 1,475
Houston -0.089 -0.130 -0.129 832
Jacksonville 0.294∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 435
Los Angeles -0.107 -0.067 -0.068 7,990
Las Vegas -0.061 -0.046 -0.046 910
Miami/So Fla 0.489∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 2,041
Minneapolis 0.176∗ 0.176∗ 0.176∗ 515
Nashville 0.105 0.079 0.080 383
New York 0.054 0.060 0.059 3,897
Orlando 0.309∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 605
Philly Metro 0.042 0.053 0.053 545
Phoenix 0.200∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 2,669
Portland -0.252∗∗ -0.288∗∗ -0.287∗∗ 658
Raleigh/Durham -0.185 -0.192 -0.190 526
Rest 0.009 0.023 0.025 5,434
San Diego 0.099 0.110 0.110 1,476
Seattle 0.081 0.067 0.066 1,943
San Francisco -0.092 -0.115 -0.118 4,043
St Louis 0.207 0.200 0.203 200
Tampa 0.335∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 1,059
Tucson 0.036 0.042 0.044 388
Washington DC -0.081 -0.016 -0.018 1,380
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. This table shows
the metro area fixed effects results for the Probit model in Table 3. The frequency of
the variables is also given by Obs. Ref. gives the reference (omitted) category. We only
include Metro areas with at least 10 redevelopments. The remaining ones are are combined
in the “rest” category.
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Table A.10: Redevelopment option value model: Year and property
type fixed effects
Variable OLS IV (i) IV (ii) IV (iii) Obs.
Year of Sale
2000 (Ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 574
2001 0.085∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 730
2002 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 899
2003 0.210∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 1,127
2004 0.329∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 1,775
2005 0.476∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 3,893
2006 0.540∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 3,888
2007 0.573∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 3,675
2008 0.531∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 1,815
2009 0.326∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 833
2010 0.287∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 1,282
2011 0.354∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 2,204
2012 0.381∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 2,998
2013 0.455∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 3,278
2014 0.543∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 3,557
2015 0.629∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 3,819
2016 0.681∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 3,464
2017 0.716∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 3,085
2018 0.780∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 2,836
Property type
Apartment (Ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 23,491
Industrial -0.243∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗* -0.256∗∗∗ 6,623
Office -0.160∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ 8,038
Retail -0.029∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗* -0.031∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ 7,580
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. This table shows the
year fixed effects results for the 2SLS model in Table 4. The frequency of the variables is
also given by Obs. Ref. gives the reference (omitted) category.
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Table A.11: Redevelopment option value model: Metro area fixed
effects
Variable OLS IV (i) IV (ii) IV (iii) Obs.
Metro area
Atlanta (Ref.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2,221
Baltimore 0.108∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 375
Boston Metro 0.279∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 580
Charlotte 0.032∗ 0.032∗ 0.032∗ 0.032∗ 512
Chicago 0.076∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 1,098
Co Springs -0.029 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 253
Dallas -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 1289
Denver 0.132∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 1,475
Houston -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 832
Jacksonville -0.061∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ 435
Los Angeles 0.446∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 7,990
Las Vegas 0.030∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.033 0.033 910
Miami/So Fla 0.260∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 2,041
Minneapolis 0.050∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 515
Nashville 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.005 383
New York 0.331∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 3,897
Orlando 0.055∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 605
Philly Metro 0.104∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 545
Phoenix 0.081∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 2,669
Portland 0.151∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 658
Raleigh/Durham 0.079∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 526
Rest -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 5,434
San Diego 0.400∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 1,476
Seattle 0.310∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 1943
San Francisco 0.498∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 4,043
St Louis -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 200
Tampa 0.046∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 1,059
Tucson -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 388
Washington DC 0.259∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 1,380
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. This table shows
the metro area fixed effects results for the 2SLS model in Table 4. The frequency of the
variables is also given by Obs. Ref. gives the reference (omitted) category. We only include
Metro areas with at least 10 redevelopments. The remaining ones are are combined in the
“rest” category.
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